Reducing Space Threats: A Resolution
QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS
Question 1: Why not support the Treaty on the Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in Outer Space, the Threat or Use of Force Against Outer Space Objects (PPWT) in addition to this resolution?
States are clearly free to do so. The new resolution isn’t mutually exclusive with any other initiative out there, but offered as a potential new route to making progress on preventing an arms race in outer space while others appear blocked. The UK doesn’t support the draft PPWT for reasons that are well known, but many of the delegations that voted in favour of the new resolution do, so clearly they see no contradiction.
The history of the PPWT resolution is long and fraught. Many states that vote against it have had persistent concerns with the draft, which they claim have not been addressed. Of those concerns, the ones publicly stated include an overall misgiving about signing onto a treaty that bans weapons in space and the use of force, but does not describe what is meant by either of those terms, and does not include verification measures, made more difficult because these objectives are not defined. The UK proposal is open ended – it does not define an end objective at this time, but rather seeks to have that develop organically through state engagement, participation, and dialogue. A vote for this resolution is not a vote against a treaty. And almost all states also voted for UN resolution L.3 in First Committee calling for negotiation of PAROS within the CD (there was not specific PPWT resolution). See “outer space” in the First Committee Monitor.
Question 2: Has the OST failed as a treaty? In 53 years only one claim has been made by Canada against the Soviet Union, yet many assertions of violations have been made but not adjudicated. We must presume that 53 years of activities in space have now become the norm. If these behaviors are in violation of the OST, when might these cases be brought to the UN for adjudication?
No, I wouldn’t say so at all. The OST is the critical bedrock of space law, and I’m not aware of any suggestion that its prohibitions of the placement of weapons of mass destruction in orbit or military activities on the Moon or other celestial bodies have been violated. But the use of space is unrecognisable from when it was when the OST was adopted, which is why we need to complement and build on the OST to address the new questions and situations that have arisen.
The OST is over 50 years old and 9 articles long. It has successfully set the standards for use of space to trend towards cooperative and peaceful, with the acknowledge that there are other uses possible. It has set the tone for international discussions on space. It didn’t predict everything but there are ways to handle the lacunae as the use of space evolves. I think that saying it is a failed treaty overlooks all the good that it established and still holds up.
The OST is probably one of the most successful treaties to date. Although brief, most of the principles are elaborated in subsequent treaties. And the principles of the OST continue to inform new space activities such as the Artemis Accords being advanced by the United States. The significant gap in this process is arms control! Overall, because it spells out principles rather than specific mandates, much is left up to interpretation, which has evolved over the years. A meeting of states parties to review and discuss implementation of the OST would be helpful, but the treaty itself is successful i.e. space remains remarkably peaceful, open for use to all, and cooperative.
Question 3: Are there any time targets for compliance for the resolution?
The resolution starts a process that we hope will lead to norms, rules and principles of responsible behaviours in outer space, but doesn’t actually set out what those might be. So at the moment there’s nothing to comply with! The first step is for UN member states to submit their views to the UN Secretary General, who will write a report on the back of them. We expect that report to issue next August, in time for discussion at next year’s UN General Assembly First Committee in October.
The resolution is intended to establish a process for state engagement and dialogue about the types of behaviours that they find both threatening and reassuring, so there is no concern with compliance per se. There is technical support being provided for states to prepare submissions to the UN Secretary-General, as part of this process, in order to facilitate broad participation and views.
Question 4: Does the Canadian, Australian MILAMOS effort to standardize language related to space activities considered to be of value?
Both the MILAMOS and the Woomera Manuals attempting to ascertain how international humanitarian law applies to space (and both of which, full disclosure, SWF has ties to) are important parts of this broader conversation. I believe that they both are attempting to finish up and publish their products in the coming year; however, once those are done, then the ideas and concepts in the manuals have to be proliferated and domesticized at the national level, so they definitely will not be “solving” space security and stability – just adding to it in the coming decade.
Question 5: How does this resolution deal with verification?
Preambular paragraph 14 recognises the challenges of effectively verifying the capabilities of space objects, while reaffirming that verification is one of the essential components of arms control instruments. But one of the advantages of the behaviour-based approach is that it largely bypasses the verification challenges in the objects-based approach given our current technology; using existing space situational awareness technology and techniques we can see the behaviour of objects in space, even if we can’t verify their capabilities.
The resolution is intended to establish a process for state engagement and dialogue about the types of behaviours that they find both threatening and reassuring, so there is no concern with verification at this stage; that would depend on what states agree upon, which itself would likely be at least one or two steps after this initial process.
Question 6: Are the UK's efforts to prevent the militarisation of space within the UN at odds with the recent definition of space as a warfighting domain within the UK Ministry of Defence's Integrated Operating Concept?
The Integrated Operating Concept refers to space as an operational domain, which is not the same thing as a ‘warfighting’ domain. What that means is that space systems enable and support military operations – as they do for many areas of civilian life – in terms of things like position, navigation and timing, communications, imagery and so forth. That’s one reason why those systems can be seen as targets for attack or disruption, and thus why it’s important to understand how the dynamics between States on Earth and in space can affect each other, and why norms, rules and principles of responsible behaviours around those systems can help reduce the vulnerabilities and tensions that drive arms races.
Question 7: The USA has formed the US Space Force. What is/will be the reactions of Russia and China to this development?
Russia and China both have had military space organizations for several years: essentially their equivalent of the Space Force. Please see SWF’s counterspace threat assessment’s (www.swfound.org/counterspace) chapters on Russia and China for specifics. Having said that, this move by the United States, taken with bombastic rhetoric from the current (and exiting) administration, has been perceived by competitors as being part of a larger effort by the United States to dominate space militarily, rather than what it actually is: a long-overdue re-organization of military space acquisition. As it stands, the US Space Force is the US Air Force Space Command with a new hat on
Question 8: Is the acknowledged need for Planetary Defence against Asteroid impact a meaningful avenue for co-operation in addressing the avoidance of Space based weaponisation in a practical sense?
I believe that these actions are in part a response to perceived threats in space, but yes, they may in turn further escalate tensions if not carried out in a way that is measured and transparent.
Question 9: My question moves from the recent announcement of the US Space Force to deploy a spy satellite in cislunar orbit around 2022. This triggered a debate on the scope of paragraph 2 of Article IV OST, and in particular whether it forbids or not military activities in lunar orbit. Could you please comment with your views?
I’m not a lawyer, but OST Article IV paragraph 2 prohibits military installations, weapons testing and military manoeuvres on the Moon, which seems pretty clear to me.
Question 10: What arguments were presented by the states that voted against the resolution? Mainly a matter for them rather than you, but as they are not on the call could you summarize what was said to you?
As you say, you’d have to ask them! Some of them indeed set out their reasoning in explanations of vote during the voting, which will be available in the records. The most sustained opposition was from Russia, who introduced a procedural motion to declare the First Committee not competent to consider the draft resolution; their argument was that the subject matter of the resolution was really about the peaceful uses of outer space, and thus properly for the Fourth Committee. We disagree, of course, and have set out why we think norms, rules and principles of responsible behaviours in space are essential for preventing an arms race in outer space and for space security more generally. The motion was soundly defeated, so it’s safe to say the Committee saw it the same way. Nevertheless, we’ve been talking to Russia for a year or so about our approach in this resolution, and remain keen to work with them as this process develops; it’s important to have every state engaged, particularly those that have special interests and capabilities in space.
This is not a response from the Ambassador who has no doubt had many candid discussions throughout the course of this year. However, there is a summary of some concerns that those dissenting states raised in statements to the United Nations First Committee available HERE (see “outer space” pg. 20)
A quick summary: some states have concerns about the language being subjective i.e. “perceptions of threats” and “responsible behaviour.” Some suggested that their concerns with the resolution have not been taken into consideration. And some want to focus on a specific arms control treaty, and nothing else.
Question 11: Most progress is made if there are time deadlines / targets etc. 'otherwise just a talking shop'? Are there any proposed timescales signed up by Governments / UN to achieve the aims proposed?
It’s no secret – or surprise – that UN processes move slowly! But we’re keen to build up some momentum behind these conversations, which is why the General Assembly has asked the Secretary-General to table his report in time for the next steps to be discussed at next year’s First Committee in October 2021. This is an organic process, though; ultimately it will move at the pace a critical mass of member states will want to move at.
The purpose of this resolution is indeed to “talk shop” and really engage states on what they view as behaviours that are both threatening and reassuring in outer space, as a baseline for thinking about specific measures and agreements down the road. This type of candid discussion simply has not happened before, and the resolution sponsors believe that it is urgently needed. The outcome is intended to be a report from the UN Secretary-General. However the timeframe is intended to keep the process progressing: I believe that the UK has indicated an intention to the table the report at the next meeting of the UN First Committee in the fall of 2021.
Question 12: Regarding ‘actions’ based/behavioural approach in comparison to ‘capability-based approach’: It is hard to define ‘acceptable actions in space’. Is the UK working with/planning to work with behavioral scientists in understanding ‘incentives’ to change perceptions/behaviour?
It’s a very good point; we’ll take that away.
Question 13: How can commercial launch be more regulated so as not to prevent future catastrophies do to too much junk in LEO
A very important question, but one that’s outside the scope of this resolution, which is all about relations between and the activities of states.
Question 14: Is the acknowledged need for Planetary Defence against Asteroid impact a meaningful avenue for co-operation in addressing the avoidance of Space based weaponisation in a practical sense?
There is an acknowledged need for cooperation on planetary defence, but that conversation is held separately from the one on arms control and security (it is a COPUOS issue rather than a First Committee/Conference on Disarmament issue). Any cooperation is meaningful for building trust and confidence across various space actors, however.
ABOUT THIS EVENT
While States seek new military capabilities in outer space, there are still very few established norms to govern military space activities. This leaves open many possibilities for misjudgment, miscalculation and even escalation.
On December 8, 2020, the Space Court Foundation and Secure World Foundation co-organizd a discussion with the U.K. Ambassador Aidan Liddle and a panel of leading space security experts about a new initiative at the U.N. to seek new norms that reduce threats to stability in space.
